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ABSTRACT
Many people do all of their banking online, we and our children communicate
with peers through computer systems, and there are many jobs that require near
continuous interaction with computer systems. Criminals, however, are also
“connected”, and our online interaction provides them a conduit into our
information like never before. Our credit card numbers and other fiscal
information are at risk, our children's personal information is exposed to the
world, and our professional reputations are on the line.
The discipline of Digital Forensics in law enforcement agencies around the
nation and world has grown to match the increased risk and potential for cyber
crimes. Even crimes that are not themselves computer-based, may be solved or
prosecuted based on digital evidence left behind by the perpetrator. However,
no widely accepted mechanism to facilitate sharing of ideas and methodologies
has emerged. Different agencies re-develop approaches that have been tested in
other jurisdictions. Even within a single agency, there is often significant
redundant work. There is great potential efficiency gain in sharing information
from digital forensic investigations.
This paper describes an on-going design and development project between
Oklahoma State University’s Center for Telecommunications and Network
Security and the Defense Cyber Crimes Center to develop a Repository of
Digital Forensic Knowledge. In its full implementation, the system has
potential to provide exceptional gains in efficiency for examiners and
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investigators. It provides a better conduit to share relevant information between
agencies and a structure through which cases can be cross-referenced to have
the most impact on a current investigation.
1. INTRODUCTION
Computer Forensics" is defined as "a sub-discipline of Digital & Multimedia
Evidence, which involves the scientific examination, analysis, end or
evaluation of digital evidence in legal matters" and "Digital Evidence" is
defined as "Information of probative value that is stored or transmitted in
binary form." [11] Taking these together or, "Digital Forensics" might be
defined as “Scientific knowledge and methods applied to the identification,
collection, preservation, examination, and analysis of information stored or
transmitted in binary form in a manner acceptable for application in legal
matters.”
Digital forensics has become an indispensable tool for law enforcement. This
science is not only applied to cases of crime committed with or against digital
assets, but is used in many physical crimes to gather evidence of intent or proof
of prior relationships. The volume of digital devices that might be explored by
a forensic analysis, however, is staggering, including anything from a home
computer to a video game console, to an engine module from a getaway
vehicle. New hardware, software, and applications are being released into
public use daily and analysts must create new and legally acceptable methods
to address each of them.
Law enforcement agencies have widely varying capabilities to conduct
forensics, sometimes enlisting the aid of other agencies or outside consultants
to perform analyses. As new techniques are developed, internally tested, and
ultimately scrutinized by the legal system, new forensic hypotheses are borne
and proven. When the same techniques are applied to other cases, the new
proceeding is strengthened by the precedent of prior case. Acceptance of a
methodology in multiple proceedings makes it more acceptable for future
cases.
Unfortunately, new forensic discoveries are rarely formally shared even within
the same agency. Sometimes briefings may be given to other analysts within
the same agency, although caseloads often dictate immediately moving on to
the next case. Very little is shared between different agencies, or even between
different offices of some federal law enforcement communities. The result of
this lack of sharing is duplication of significant effort to re-discover the same
or similar approaches to prior cases and a failure to take advantage of
precedent rulings that may strengthen the admission of a certain process.
A need exists to create a “National Repository of Digital Forensic Information”
to address these issues. Harrison, et. al., [7] proposed a repository for sharing
information in 2002, but no such effort has been accepted by a significant
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portion of the law enforcement community in a manner that allows previous
discoveries to be best applied to future cases even within a single agency.
Sharing of forensic knowledge between law enforcement agencies is almost
entirely informal, and based on hearing about previous casework and
contacting the case agent for more information.
We propose a design for such a repository that attempts to address many of the
recognized impediments. The Center for Telecommunications and Network
Security (CTANS) at Oklahoma State University is collaborating with the
Defense Cyber Crimes Center (DC3) to implement a system prototype that we
expect to make available to other cooperating law enforcement agencies. This
paper outlines major elements of the working design and expected
impediments to successful widespread implementation. Application of digital
forensics extends far beyond criminal investigations. DC3, for instance, is a
defense agency, so the structure of this model encompasses not only criminal
matters [see Figure 1], but also forensic information for foreign intelligence
and cyber needs. Approaches in media analysis and other forensic components
overlap between these areas extensively, so a shared repository that can be
applied in all areas will be of most benefit.
Foreign
Intelligence

Criminal
Intelligence

Digital
Forensic
Intelligence

Cyber
Intelligence

Figure 1: DC3 Digital Forensic Intelligence Model
2. WORKING DESIGN MODEL
Through interactions between CTANS and DC3, as well as other law
enforcement agencies, a working design for the implementation has been
developed. It allows for a modular implementation of features and a distributed
structure that recognizes a varying willingness to share information between
agencies. The major components are: 1) Digital Forensic Information
Knowledge Base; 2) expert system and best practices for Forensic
Investigations; 3) certified and available tools index; and 4) forensic case
index. Each of these is briefly described below.
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3. DIGITAL FORENSIC INTELLIGENCE KNOWLEDGE BASE
A “knowledge base” is typically a machine-readable repository of information.
It goes beyond raw facts about a specific domain, but attempts to capture
relationships between them and the context in which decisions were made.
Each investigation and court proceeding are different from any that preceded
them, although there are many potential commonalities. Given this, it is
important to capture data, relationships, and contexts.
The knowledge base is at the core of this project. It is ultimately a type of case
tracking system that stores all forensic discoveries related to a case from the
time evidence is seized until the complete forensic analysis is returned to the
responsible case investigator. Every law enforcement agency has slightly
different procedures that they follow. Rules of evidence are similar across
jurisdiction, however, so the basic process of one agency likely has more
commonalities than differences with any other. Our design was modeled after
the process employed by the Defense Cyber Forensics Laboratory (DCFL),
which “provides digital evidence processing, analysis, and diagnostics for any
DoD investigation that requires computer forensic support to detect, enhance,
or recover digital media, to include audio and video. This includes criminal,
counterintelligence, counterterrorism, and fraud investigations.” [10]
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Figure 2: Cyber Forensics Investigation Model
Figure 2 graphically depicts this process. Because DCFL processes evidence
for multiple agencies, they are often not involved in the seizure of that
evidence, so the point of entry into their cycle is when the evidence custodian
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receives the materials from any of the investigating agencies. Imaging,
examiner assignment, media analysis, various reviews, and administrative
actions follow.
Each of these steps is well documented and will be entered into the repository,
along with scans of provided data. It will be indexed on the assigned case
number, but will also have a full-text search capability to enable one method of
locating related data from previous cases. A single case may now generate
reams of paper reports, so a digital method to locate items within any of many
reports and to eventually create an automatic cross-index of cases has great
potential to aid future analyses.
4. EXPERT SYSTEM AND BEST PRACTICES
Newer examiners learn from the human experts in the lab, however, additional
support is always welcome. An expert system would guide a user through more
common forensic analyses with a series of questions, the answers to which will
generate procedural documents and ask for input based on the results. This is
not intended to replace human guidance, but may provide ideas about how to
proceed in a specific case.
There are numerous articles that explain some best practices in forensics. These
can then be modified and applied by an analyst as required by a particular
investigation. There is no recognized central repository of best practices,
although several exist, such as through the Scientific Working Group on
Digital Evidence and the United States Secret Service. When these best
practices are used in a case, or referenced by the expert system, they will
become a part of the repository to fully explain the context and applied process
for future examiners.
5. CERTIFIED AND AVAILABLE TOOLS INDEX
One of the three parts of DC3 is the Defense Cyber Crime Institute (DCCI). It
provides legally and scientifically accepted standards, techniques,
methodologies, research, tools, and technologies for computer forensics to
meet DoD needs in counterintelligence, intelligence, information assurance,
information operations, and law enforcement. A major part of that effort is to
test tools and techniques in a realistic environment for their scientific validity
and legal admissibility. This information is used to maintain a catalog of tools,
along with the testing and analysis report for each. An independent validation
of a tool prior to its application in an investigation provides enhanced
credibility when presented in a legal proceeding.
This catalog is current available within the DoD and law enforcement
community by request to DCCI. This prevents cyber criminals from exploiting
weaknesses in forensic tools that are discovered in this process. Each item in
the tools catalog has a testing and evaluation report that serves as partial
justification for its use in any investigation. By including this in the repository,
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a given object (along with the report) can be referenced in many different
cases, without the need to include extensive and repetitive documentation
across multiple cases.
There are also many tools that are available and not yet tested by DCCI. They
may be used by law enforcement agencies, if the case dictates that. Each time a
tool or technique is applied, that creates a record that supports its use or
omission in similar future cases. Fully testing and reporting on any tool is a
very time-consuming process and it is not always possible to wait for full
vetting, due to time limitations on proceedings. The shared repository allows
refinement and acceptability to be enhanced among many examiners and
agencies, even before full testing.
6. FUSION, SEARCH AND RETRIEVAL CAPABILITIES
A shared repository is, in a sense, a database. The primary need of the
repository is to build capability to fuse various cyber forensics cases into useful
knowledge for the investigator. Information fusion is the process of
intelligently combining the information (predictions) created and provided by
two or more information sources (prediction models). Although there is an
ongoing debate about the sophistication level of the fusion methods to be
employed, there is a general consensus that fusion (combining forecasts and/or
predictions) produces more useful information for decisions to be based upon
[1]. It has been shown that fusion can improve accuracy, completeness, and
robustness of information, while reducing uncertainty and bias associated with
the individual predictors [3].
Once implemented, investigators can then use the repository as a data
warehouse to quickly locate similar cases and capabilities. However, it is
important to note that much of the information provided by investigators is in
text format. Cyber forensics cases often include long written passage
documenting the investigation process and the tools used. Because of this, text
mining capabilities must be included in the repository.
Data Mining is the process of identifying valid, novel, potentially useful, and
ultimately understandable patterns in data [6] stored in structured databases,
where the data is organized in records structured by categorical, ordinal and
continuous variables. However, vast majority of real world data is stored in
documents that are virtually unstructured. According to a recent study by
Merrill Lynch and Gartner 85 to 90 percent of all organizational data is stored
in some kind of unstructured form (i.e., as text) [9]. This is where the text
mining fits into the picture. Text mining is the process of discovering new,
previously unknown, potentially useful information from variety of
unstructured data sources including organizational documents.
Benefits of text mining are obvious in the areas where a large quantity of
textual data is collected from organizational transactions. For example, free-
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form text of user interactions and experiences allows trending over time in the
areas of problems and complaints, which is clearly input to better equipment
and system development. By not restricting the feedback to a codified form,
the subject can present, in her own words, what she experiences and thinks
about the domain of interest.
The common applications of text mining include Information Extraction
(identifying key phrases and relationships within text by looking for predefined
sequences in text via the process called pattern matching), Topic Tracking (by
keeping user profiles and, based on the documents the user views, predicts
other documents of interest to the user), Summarization (possessing and
summarizing the document to its essence in order to save time on the part of
the reader), Categorization (identifying the main themes of a document and
doing so placing the document into a pre-defined set of topics categories),
Clustering (grouping documents that are similar to each other without having a
pre-defined set of categories), Concept Linking (connect related documents by
identifying their commonly shared concepts and by doing so help users find
information that they perhaps wouldn’t have found using traditional searching
methods), and Question Answering (deals with finding the best answer to a
given question by knowledge driven pattern matching).
7. IMPEDIMENTS TO ADOPTION
There have been previous attempts to create centralized repositories for digital
forensics. None have succeeded, except on a localized basis. The reasons most
often cited are 1) a desire for discovering agency to completely control the
data; 2) concerns about confidentiality or classification of data; 3) increased
task load of entering data to support this initiative; and 4) concerns about
unnecessary discovery provided to the defense or that more public information
will help criminals avoid capture and/or prosecution;. This section overviews
each of these concerns and provides an illustrative example of how our design
for information structure leaves control of these important characteristics to the
individual agencies.
7.1 Reluctance to Share Information Between Agencies
Jurisdictions of various law enforcement agencies overlap geographically.
Within a single location, there may be a County Sheriff, City Police, State
Police, and various federal agencies, any of which may investigate a crime
depending upon the circumstances. There is a great sense of ownership of
criminal case by investigators, so this overlap creates a kind of competition
between the groups. Furthermore, law enforcement professionals and, more
specifically, cyber security professionals tend to rely more on personal social
networks rather than more formal repositories of information thus impeding
information sharing in this domain [8].
This clearly extends to new systems. Individual investigators are very willing
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to seek helpful information that is made available from any source, however,
most have a great reluctance to release information beyond what is required.
This is partially due to the aforementioned competitive nature, but also is done
to protect their techniques from current and future criminals who may improve
their skills with any knowledge that is available. Unfortunately, a knowledge
repository will require wide input in order to leverage the knowledge of others,
so this hurdle must be overcome.
The proposed system provides optional authorship recognition to investigators
and agencies that contribute information that is used (and therefore linked) to
another case. Cases that are repeatedly cited would be clearly recognizable as
“critical” by their peers. The amount of information provided in that
recognition would be up to the providing agency. However, recognition has
proven to be a successful reward mechanism in the organization science
literature [4]. Access to this system will be limited to DoD and law
enforcement, except as is required by law. This mitigates the concern about
criminals using the information to improve their own skills.
7.2 Classification Issues
Particularly in the DoD and Federal investigative agencies, some cases, or
portions thereof, may be classified. In that case, the documents, evidence, and
systems must be properly secured, and personnel with access must be
appropriately cleared. An open sharing system is not an option in this case.
Individual agencies, however, can implement instances of our system to create
a knowledge base of their own classified projects, with access restrictions on a
per-user basis. They may also access their own or separate systems to assist in
the case on an unclassified system and network. Further, individual
investigators in the organization may allow members of their personal social
network to access their knowledge. The level of the access can be control by
the sharing investigator.
7.3 Increased Task Load
Requiring members of investigative agencies to input data will increase their
task load. The individual agencies already have information collection
mechanisms. Any attempt to require investigators to input data into a central
repository will increase their workload. As such, even those that would want
to share information would not do it because they have other priorities. This is
a problem often overlooked by well-meaning researchers who develop
impressive data repositories and wonder why investigators will not contribute
to their content. Initially, system data within the DC3 system is taken entirely
from electronic worksheets that the analysts already use. As part of the normal
case maintenance a clerk submits the entire file to the system, which
automatically parses and indexes it. Our approach allows organizations to
maintain their own data repositories and requires minimal increase in taskload.
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7.4 Discovery Vulnerability
Reticence to share information across agencies can be driven by a variety of
factors. One such factor is the concern over disclosure of practices and
techniques that will be ultimately be nullified by a general awareness among
the public and more specifically those committing offenses. While the security
of such information may be easily protected with regard to casual observation,
if disclosure is mandated as part of any court order or legal proceeding, the
efficiency of some digital forensic science methodologies may be reduced.
Initially, by observing appropriate protocols in the cataloging of information,
this risk is minimized.
There are certain legal protections in place that also reduce the potential for
disclosure of law enforcement techniques and methods including those that are
related to digital forensics. For example, the Freedom of Information Act, 5
U.S.C. § 552 clearly exempts from disclosure “records or information
compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the
production of such law enforcement records or information….would disclose
techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions,
or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or
prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk
circumvention of the law…”
In court proceedings, discovery of digital forensic techniques by defendants in
criminal cases may also be limited under the privilege recognized by the
Eleventh Circuit court in United States v. Horn 789 F.2d 1492 (11th Cir. 1986).
A subsequent case of United States v. Garey, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23477,
summarized that court’s holding as “In general, the Eleventh Circuit and other
courts applying the investigative techniques privilege have held that where the
defendant has access to evidence, such as the product of the surveillance, from
which a jury can determine the accuracy and validity of the surveillance
equipment and techniques, the defendant has no need for the information that
outweighs the government's interest in keeping it secret.”
8. ANCHORED FLEXIBLE LOGICAL MESH STRUCTURE TO LIMIT
IMPEDIMENTS
Every agency has different issues with data sharing and must be given the
flexibility to determine the degree to which they will use data provided by
others and/or contribute information about their discoveries to the community.
Of course, the global benefit is maximized by everyone sharing all discoveries
with all other groups, so there must be stimulus for that. Our model can be
termed an “anchored, flexible, logical mesh.” It is anchored on a core
repository that will contain information made available to all authorized
agencies without restriction. For example, the core repository may contain
information on relevant laws and legal precedents that all forensics
organizations may want to access. Ideally, it would house the common
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knowledge that all organization would typically maintain and therefore remove
the need for individual agencies to store and update the information
themselves. Most participants will at least read information from the core
repository. Relationships between servers are entirely flexible and up to the
administrators of the servers themselves.
Protected Network
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Small Agency

FO
NSA
FBI

SF PD

FO
FO

FO

Core
Repository

FO

CIA
Isolated Network

Local
Coop.

DoD
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FO
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Figure 3: Anchored Logical Mesh of Repository Servers
Figure 3 shows several different examples of how this may be implemented.
The diagram is not intended to reflect current or planned cooperative
relationships between specific agencies that might participate in the repository.
It is provided purely as a notional illustration:


The DoD has a repository for storing information that they want to
make available to their investigative agencies, but not outside the
DoD, although the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), the
Air Force Office of Special Investigation (AFOSI), and their field
offices can directly use and contribute to the core repository as well,
or retain data only within their agency without elevating it even to the
level of DoD.



The FBI offices have a similar structure, but one of the field offices
may cooperate extensively with one of the NCIS or AFOSI field
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offices in the same city and liberally share new discoveries with each
other. This creates a new “neighborhood” that is labeled “local coop”
in the figure.


Small agencies may have a single repository for their lessons learned,
but they share with the core repository. In the extreme, there may be
no local storage at all, but a web interface directly into the core
repository. A small sheriff’s office with a forensic capability can
leverage the lessons learned in many other participating agencies with
little investment.



Some data is very sensitive. In the figure, the NSA is shown with a
neighborhood among its own central node and field offices, but only
as a consumer of data from the central repository. This will not benefit
other agencies; however, some organization’s requirements will
prohibit sharing information.



Finally, there will be some agencies that choose to be entirely isolated.
They can neither benefit from the central repository nor enhance it,
because of a logical and/or physical separation. The underlying system
design, however, allows them to share among their own
neighborhood, while retaining complete control of hardware, software,
and data.

Although there are certain impediments to the building a National Forensic
Repository, the literature suggests that many of these can be overcome by
employing various strategies toward promoting information sharing, protecting
internal investigative procedures, and providing a multi-level approach. The
strategies should help mitigate agencies’ concerns toward using such a system.
Investigators may still rely on their social networks for information regarding a
case investigation, however our approach offer a means of providing
standardization to the process. It allows investigator to share information
while preventing release of internally sensitive data.
9. CONCLUSION
Network technology available to the average consumer has rapidly expanded.
Valuable information about many facets of our lives resides on computer
systems and traverse public networks. The value of this information and the
potential value of the misuse of that information create increasing motivation
to criminals to commit cyber crime. Law enforcement agencies at all levels
have met this challenge with new investigative techniques and digital forensic
analysis to compliment their existing skills. An information repository that
allows these geographically and bureaucratically diverse groups to share
information about cyber crimes and digital investigation would aid every
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agency in successfully and efficiently prosecuting a case.
An ongoing project between Oklahoma State University and the Defense
Cyber Crimes Center aims to meet this growing need. The National Repository
of Digital Forensic Information will provide a platform for tracking details of
cases as they are handles and a reference system to previous investigations that
might be related. It will also provide a relevant legal index to help gauge the
success of various prior approaches in court and an expert system to assist
investigators who are assigned to case types that are less familiar to them.
There are many non-technical impediments to widespread adoption of the
system to make it most valuable. Although some of the recognized issues have
been addressed in this paper, more work must be done in this area. A full crossagency implementation of this system has the potential to greatly leverage
existing examiner and investigator skills and to allow newer investigators to
more quickly acquire the best approaches for successful legal proceedings.
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